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vRÉSUMÉ
Beaucoup de systèmes à grande échelle tels que les systèmes de transport intelligents, les réseaux
intelligents ou les bâtiments intelligents requièrent que des individus contribuent leurs flux de don-
nées privées afin d’amasser, stocker, manipuler et analyser les informations pour le traitement du
signal et à des fins de prise de décision. Dans un scénario typique, un essaim de capteurs produit
des signaux d’entrée à valeurs discrètes décrivant l’occurrence d’événements relatifs à ces indi-
vidus. En conséquence, des statistiques utiles doivent être publiées continuellement et en temps
réel. Cependant, cela peut engendrer une perte de confidentialité pour les utilisateurs. Cette thèse
considère le problème de fournir des garanties de confidentialité différentielle pour ces systèmes
multi-sorties multi-entrées fonctionnant en continu. En particulier, nous considérons la question de
confidentialité dans le contexte de la théorie des systèmes et nous étudions le problème de géné-
ration de signaux qui respectent la confidentialité des utilisateurs qui activent les capteurs. Nous
présentons une nouvelle architecture d’estimation des flux de trafic préservant la confidentialité des
conducteurs. Nous introduisons aussi une surveillance différentiellement confidentielle d’occupa-
tion dans un bâtiment équipé d’un dense réseau de capteurs de détection de mouvement, qui sera
utile par exemple pour commander le système HVAC.
vi
ABSTRACT
Many large-scale systems such as intelligent transportation systems, smart grids or smart buildings
require individuals to contribute their private data streams in order to amass, store, manipulate and
analyze information for signal processing and decision-making purposes. In a typical scenario,
swarms of sensors produce discrete-valued input signals that describe the occurrence of events in-
volving these users and several statistics of interest need to be continuously published in real-time.
This can however engender a privacy loss for the users in exchange of the utility provided by the
application. This thesis considers the problem of providing differential privacy guarantees for such
multi-input multi-output systems operating continuously. In particular, we consider the privacy is-
sues in a system theoretic context, and address the problem of releasing filtered signals that respect
the privacy of users who activate the sensors. As a result of this thesis we present a new architecture
for privacy preserving estimation of traffic flows. We also introduce differentially private monitor-
ing and forecasting occupancy in a building equipped with a dense network of motion detection
sensors, which is useful for example to control its HVAC system.
vii
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1CHAPITRE 1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, applications which require individuals to contribute their private data in order to amass,
store, manipulate and analyze information for decision-making purposes have become increasingly
popular. But, whether this aggregated data is used in the service of a specific business, political
party or even a new scientific finding, researchers also raise questions for the individuals whose
information comprises these "big data" sets. Is it really possible to guarantee that the individuals’
information will remain private ?
Before start talking about different anonymization techniques, we first recap two famous informa-
tion breaches that have occurred in two large companies (AOL and Netflix) and have been widely
covered both in the academic literature and news media.
1.1 AOL Search Log Leakage
On August 2nd, 2006, the AOL search log released a file consisting more than 20 million search
queries for over 600,000 users over a period of 3-months. This file was released for research pur-
poses and for security issues AOL deleted the search data on their site on next day. However the
file circulated widely on internet and was even restored by mirror websites[4]. The information
amassed in the report was anonymized and did not re-identify the users, however, some personal
information presented in many of the keywords could be linked with external information in order
to uniquely identify individuals. For example, the New York Times published on August 9, 2006,
successfully discerned the user No. 4417749, as follows [5]. "No. 4417749 conducted hundreds
of searches over a three-month period on topics ranging from "numb fingers" to "60 single men"
to "dog" that urinates on everything. It did not take much investigating to follow that data trail to
Thelma Arnold, a 62-year-old widow who lives in Lilburn, Ga."
1.2 Netflix Prize
Netflix, Inc. is an online service provider of movie streaming available to viewers in many coun-
tries. In October, 2006, Netflix released a dataset that included over 100 million ratings contributed
by over 450 thousand users to 18000 movies. They announced a contest among the data mining,
machine learning and computer science communities with a million dollar prize for the best pre-
diction algorithm that could beat their existing movie recommendation algorithm[6]. The dataset
provided by Netflix however was modified deliberately to protect the privacy of the users. For
2example, they removed all sensitive information such as name, user-name, age, and location[7].
They even intentionally perturbed "some of the ratings" for random customers in one of the follo-
wing ways : deleting some of their ratings, and modifying the rating dates [6]. The released data
consisted of attributes such as randomly assigned numeric user id, movie, date and the value of the
rating on a particular scale. However, one year later A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov [8] showed
how to re-identify several users in the released Netflix file simply by crosscorrelating the anonymi-
zed ratings with non-private movie ratings on the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) website.
Basically, linkage attacks aim at linking the output of a query to a record or a value in a given table
to establish the presence or absence of a target individual. These type of attacks are divided into
two major groups of deterministic attacks and stochastic attacks [1].
1.3 Deterministic linkage attacks
These attacks mainly try to link an individual to an unprotected or deterministically protected publi-
shed dataset based on arbitrary side information, including user level information,(name, sex,etc)
or an exclusive value that belongs to the victim like her carrier. Deterministic methods of sanitizing
a dataset mainly rely on anonymizing, e.g, Sweeney [9] proposed k-anonymity which requires that
for each set of attributes in the table, there must be at least k − 1 other records with the same attri-
bute. For example, a health care service center who frequently updates its patients’ symptoms, can
be attacked by adversaries as shown in Fig. 1.1 . The information sorted in the table has already
been anonymized, however the level of anonymity is not enough to prevent information leakage of
a particular patient, named Audrey. By increasing the level of anonymity to 3-anonymity as shown
in Fig. 1.2 , the published table becomes protected against this particular type of attacks.
However, even Table . 1.2 could be vulnerable to some attacks, for example, assume the attacker
knows Audrey and he also knows that she does not have the visible flu symptoms. According to the
data Table . 1.2, he could infer Audrey has HIV.
3Figure 1.1 Anonymized Table of attributes for each patient recorded by healthcare center could
be linked with side attributes available to an attacker. For example, although Audrey’s record has
already been anonymized, an attacker who knows that Audrey is under treatment could identify her
disease according to the published anonymized patients table.
Figure 1.2 3-anonymous table [1]
The main drawback of this notion of privacy is the privacy preserving method does not model the
adversaries’ background knowledge. To resolve this problem, stochastic privacy preserving models
4popped up.
1.4 Stochastic linkage attacks
These attacks mainly try to conclude a particular individual’s attribute in a probabilistic way. For
example, assume that an adversary knows the victim has HIV with probability 0.2. If he can derive
from the published table that the victim has HIV with probability 0.7, then he has done a probabilis-
tic attack successfully, since the difference between the prior (0.2) and posterior (0.7) probabilities
is meaningfully big [1]. On the contrary, stochastic privacy models that deal with probabilistic at-
tacks often try to restrict the difference between an adversary’s prior and posterior probabilistic
knowledge of an attribute of a victim. All of these techniques rely on randomization of the database
and each model has designed to handle a particular type of attack.
1.5 Objectives of the thesis
In the last few years, a strong notion of privacy, namely, differential privacy has emerged, which
provides some privacy guarantees against adversaries with arbitrary side information. Differential
Privacy [10] aims at limiting the risk enhancement to one’s privacy when she contributes her data
to a statistical database [7]. This model ensures that adding or removing a single record does not
significantly affect the outcome of the sanitized algorithm. In this thesis, we focus on the notion of
(, δ)-differential privacy that formalizes the trade-off between privacy and utility in sanitizing an
applications. The smaller values of parameters  and δ indicate the stronger privacy guarantees pro-
vided to the users’ records. However strong privacy guarantees could have negative impacts on the
performance of the applications analyzing these records. In other words, the stronger privacy gua-
rantee for an application outcome requires the bigger noise injection to the database. Hence, diffe-
rential privacy could require large perturbations to an analysis outcome in order to hide the presence
of individuals [11] . This is especially true for applications where users frequently contribute data
over time, and it is hence crucial to design advanced mechanisms restricting the impact on system
performance of differential privacy constraints [11] . These applications could vary from intelligent
transportation systems to smart grids and smart buildings. This thesis focuses on designing a pri-
vacy preserving architecture for such a real-time applications from a signal processing perspective.
Previous work on designing differentially private time-series mechanisms includes [12] and [13],
where they propose structures that could not be implemented in real-time. Inspired by [11], here,
we consider the problem of designing differentially private real-time architectures for time-series
applications. We extend the mechanism of [11] which was proposed for Single-Input Single-Output
applications, to the Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) type of time-series queries. Our result
5considerably broadens the applicability of the ideas to real-time applications compared to the ana-
lysis in [11]. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. We first present in Chapter 2, necessary
theoretical background on differential privacy. We then consider the problem of providing differen-
tial privacy guarantees for MIMO systems in Chapter 3 [14] The theoretical analysis results are then
implemented in a real world application which aims at privately estimating and forecasting occu-
pancy in a building equipped with a network of motion detectors. The goal of a differential privacy
constraint in the building monitoring application is that an individual user cannot be tracked too
precisely from the published data. In Chapter 4 , we present a differentially private real time traffic
estimator. Our results improves over the state of the art and has immediate applications in Highway
Traffic Management Systems (HTMS). Finally, we conclude with a brief review in Chapter. 5 .
6CHAPITRE 2 DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this chapter we review the notion of differential privacy which provides strong quantitative pri-
vacy guarantees for the users data. As mentioned in the introduction 1.4, differential privacy is a
randomization-based notion of privacy. This notion could securely compose even in the presence
of arbitrary side information [? ]. This model ensures that adding or removing a single user’s data
record does not significantly affect the outcome of any data synthesis [15].
Definition of Differential Privacy
Formally, we start by defining a symmetric binary relation, denoted Adj, on the space of datasets D
of interest, which is used to define what it means for two datasets to differ by the data of a single
individual. For any d,d′ subsets of D , we have Adj(d, d′) if and only if we can obtain the signal d′
from d simply by adding or subtracting the data of one user. Then mechanisms that are differentially
private necessarily randomize their outputs, in such a way that they satisfy the following property.
Definition 1. Let D be a space equipped with a symmetric binary relation denoted Adj, and let
(R,M) be a measurable space. Let , δ ≥ 0. A mechanism M : D × Ω → R is (, δ)-differentially
private for Adj if for all d, d′ ∈ D such that Adj(d, d′), we have
P(M(d) ∈ S ) ≤ eP(M(d′) ∈ S ) + δ, ∀S ∈ M. (2.1)
If δ = 0, the mechanism is said to be -differentially private.
This definition quantifies the allowed deviation for the output distribution of a differentially private
mechanism, when a single individual is added or removed from a dataset. If the inequality fails,
then a leakage ((, δ) breach) takes place. This simply means that the difference between the prior
distribution and posterior one is tangible.
The choice of the parameters , δ is set by the privacy policy. Typically  is taken to be a small
constant, e.g.,  ≈ 0.5 or perhaps even ln p for some small p ∈ N. The parameter δ should be
kept small as it controls the probability of certain significant losses of privacy, e.g., when a zero
probability event for input d′ becomes an event with positive probability for input d in (2.1). One
fundamental property of the notion of differential privacy which is widely used in Chapter 3 , is that
no additional privacy loss can occur by simply manipulating an output that is differentially private.
To state it, recall that a probability kernel between two measurable spaces (R1,M1) and (R2,M2)
is a function k : R1 ×M2 → [0, 1] such that k(·, S ) is measurable for each S ∈ M2 and k(r, ·) is a
probability measure for each r ∈ R1.
7Figure 2.1 Probability distributions on two Adjacent data bases
Theorem 1 (Resilience to post-processing [16]). Let M1 : D × Ω → (R1,M1) be an (, δ)-
differentially private mechanism. Let M2 : D × Ω → (R2,M2) be another mechanism, such that
there exists a probability kernel k : R1 ×M2 → [0, 1] verifying
P(M2(d) ∈ S |M1(d)) = k(M1(d), S ), almost surely, (2.2)
for all S ∈ M2 and d ∈ D. Then M2 is (, δ)-differentially private.
Note that in (2.2), the kernel k is not allowed to depend on the dataset d. In other words, this
condition says that once M1(d) is known, the distribution of M2(d) does not further depend on d.
Hence a mechanism M2 accessing a dataset only indirectly via the output of a differentially private
mechanism M1 cannot weaken the privacy guarantee. Another feature of differential privacy that
is used in the thesis is the characterization of differential privacy under adaptive composition. The
following theorem shows that the privacy degrades under composition to the sum of the differential
privacy parameters of each access.
Theorem 2 ([17]). Consider M1, ...Mr, r mechanisms on a space D, where Mi is (i,δi)-differentially
private. Then the mechanism M = (M1, ....,Mr), which, for d ∈ D, outputs (M1(d), .....Mr(d)), is at
least (
∑r
i=1 i,
∑r
i=1 δi)-differentially private.
However, it is noted that differential privacy might return answers to queries that may not be useful
in practice. A mechanism that throws away all the information in a dataset is obviously private, but
not useful, and in general one has to trade off privacy for utility when answering specific queries.
We are only concerned in this thesis with queries that return numerical answers, i.e., here a query
is a map q : D → R is equipped with an euclidean norm denoted ‖ · ‖R, and the σ-algebraM on R
is taken to be the standard Borel σ-algebra. The following quantity plays an important role in the
design of differentially private mechanisms [18].
Definition 2. Let D be a space equipped with an adjacency relation Adj. The sensitivity of a query
q : D → R is defined as ∆Rq := maxd,d′:Adj(d,d′) ‖q(d) − q(d′)‖R. In particular, for R = Rk equipped
with the p-norm ‖x‖p =
(∑k
i=1 |xi|p
)1/p
, for p ∈ [1,∞], we denote the `p sensitivity by ∆pq.
8The magnitude of the distortion required for differentially private publishing the outcomes of a
query is then demonstrated in the following theorem. We recall below a basic mechanism that is
proposed in [19], perturbs the numerical outcomes of a query by adding i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian
noise. Recall the definition of the Q-function Q(x) := 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x
e−
u2
2 du, we have [16, 19]
Theorem 3. Let q : D → Rk be a query. Then the Gaussian mechanism Mq : D × Ω → Rk defined
by Mq(d) = q(d) + w, with w ∼ N
(
0, σ2Ik
)
, where σ ≥ ∆2q2 (K +
√
K2 + 2) and K = Q−1(δ), is
(, δ)-differentially private.
For the rest of the thesis, we define κδ, = 12 (K +
√
K2 + 2), so that the standard deviation σ in
Theorem 3 can be written σ(δ, ) = κδ,∆2q. The mechanism M described in Theorem 3, producing
a differentially-private version of a query q, is called an output-perturbation mechanism.
To illustrate the definitions and theorems presented in this chapter, let’s consider the following
example. Assume we have a medical database D1 where each record is a pair (Name,X), where X
∈ {0, 1}, denotes whether a person has HIV or not. For instance
Name X
Joe 0
Philip 1
Tom 1
Judy 1
Chris 0
Now assume that an attacker wants to find out if Tom has HIV or not. Suppose that he also knows
Tom receives his blood test at time t0. If the health center continuously updates the number of
people who has HIV by a query q(t), the adversary simply executes q(t+0 ) − q(t−0 ) and finds Tom’s
HIV status. This example shows that user’s private data could be revealed even without explicitly
querying for one particular person’s record. Now let’s first construct the adjacent dataset D2 by
replacing (Tom,1) with (Tom,0). Based on Definition 2, the sensitivity of q is 1 and in order for
(, δ)-differentially private publishing the outcome of q(t), based on Theorem 3, we must inject
i.i.d. Gaussian noise w ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
to each outcome of q(t), where σ ≥ κδ, . In addition Resilience
to post-processing indicates that any analysis on the published q(t)+w could not weaken the privacy
guarantee.
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3.1 Introduction
Recently many applications required to be equipped with swarms of sensors and detectors [20],
with the goal of immensely improving the efficiency of standard activities and industries, from
healthcare to traffic management systems to power grids. At the same time, it is becoming clear
that while releasing and sharing large datasets improves the performance of large-scale systems
and helps individuals and organizations to have better data analyses and predictions, these systems
could pose a risk to our privacy, and more work is needed to provide rigorous ways to tradeoff
privacy with utility [21] . This chapter studies such tradeoffs under the notion of differential pri-
vacy in the context of real-time systems. The real-time requirement is motivated by the fact that
we would like to integrate our filter outputs into real-time information and decision-making sys-
tems, e.g., motion detectors in buildings [14] presented in this chapter or loop inductors in traffic
information system which is presented in Chapter 4 . Choosing the notion of differential privacy
is motivated by the fact that this notion is particularly convenient to pose privacy guarantee for
real-time applications, because its requirements could be respected simply by adding noise to the
dataset. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section. 3.2 provides some background
on the subject of privacy preserving approximation set-ups of real time systems. Section 3.3 intro-
duces our problem formulation. Section 3.4 presents certain preliminary calculations necessary to
develop our differentially-private dynamic mechanisms, which is the object of Section 3.5. Finally,
in Section 3.6 we briefly describe an application to privately estimating and forecasting occupancy
in a building equipped with a network of motion detectors.
3.2 Background
Previous work on designing differentially private mechanisms for the publication of time-series in-
clude [13, 22], but these mechanisms are not causal and hence not suited for real-time applications.
The papers [23, 24], [25] provide real-time mechanisms to approximate a few specific filters, trans-
forming event streams input into public output streams. For example, [23, 24] consider a private
accumulator providing the total number of events that occurred in the past. This chapter is inspired
by this scenario, and builds on J. Le Ny et al work on this problem [26, Section IV] [16, Section
VI]. Here we extend the analysis presented in [11, 16, 26] , to multi-input multi-output systems,
which considerably broadens the applicability of these ideas to common situations where multiple
sensors monitor an environment and we wish to concurrently publish several statistics of interest.
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A typical application example is that of analyzing spatio-temporal records provided by networks of
simple counting sensors [3] .
3.3 Problem Statement
3.3.1 MIMO Event Stream Filtering
We consider a system equipped with m sensors detecting events, with each sensor i producing a
discrete-time sequence {ui,t}t≥0 ∈ R, for i ∈ [1,m]. In a building monitoring scenario for example,
described in Section 3.6 , the sensors could be some motion detectors dispensed at various locations
which transmit continuously the number of detected events for period t. We denote u the resulting
vector valued signal, i.e., ut ∈ Rm. The goal is to release a filtered stream Fu for a particular
application, where F is a linear time-invariant system, with m inputs and p outputs. The filter
actually takes the input signal from the sensors and publishes output signals y of interest, with
yt ∈ Rp. For example, we might be interested in continuously monitoring the number of people
in various parts of the building. In this case, we could design a real-time estimator updating the
number of people in each section. Another application includes short- and medium-term occupancy
forecasts, in order to optimize the operations of the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
(HVAC) system.
The problem considered in this chapter consists in replacing the filter F by a system processing
the input u and producing a signal y˜ as close as possible to the desired output y = Fu (here, in the
mean-squared sense), while providing some privacy guarantees to the users from which the input
signals u originate. The privacy requirement is then explained and quantified in the next subsection.
3.3.2 Differential Privacy For MIMO Event Streams
In this chapter our goal is to pose differential privacy guarantees to the scenarios where individuals
continuously share their records with a third party in order for receiving some utilities. In our
building monitoring application for example, one goal of a privacy constraint could be to provide
guarantees that an individual user cannot be tracked too precisely from the published data. Indeed,
Wilson and Atkeson [27] for example demonstrate how to track individual users in a building using
a network of simple binary sensors such as motion detectors.
Adjacency Relation
We first start by considering the adjacency relation presented in Chapter. 2. Here, D := {u : N 7→
Rm}, and we have Adj(u, u′) if and only if we can obtain the signal u′ from u simply by adding or
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subtracting the events corresponding to one user. That is
Adjk(u, u′) iff
∀i ∈ [m],∃ti ∈ N, αi, s.t. u′i − ui = αiδti , |αi| ≤ ki. (3.1)
In other words, it is assumed that a single individual can affect each input signal component at a
single time (here δti denotes the discrete impulse signal with impulse at ti), and by at most ki ∈
R+. The following notation will be used in the following. We denote by k ∈ Rm the vector with
components ki. Also, let ei ∈ Rm be the ith basis vector, i.e., ei j = δi j, j = 1, . . . ,m. Then for two
adjacent signals u, u′, we have
u′ − u =
m∑
i=1
αiδtiei. (3.2)
The adjacency definition (3.1) indicates that for an individual to be differentially private protected,
he must respect two main constraints. First he can only activate each sensor once in order to report
his event. This requirement makes sense in applications like traffic monitoring (Chapter 4) with
fixed loop detectors activated only once by each car traveling along a road, or for certain location-
based services where a customer would check-in say at most once per day at each visited store.
For a building monitoring scenario however, one person could trigger the same motion detector
several times over a short period of interest. To solve this problem one simple but efficient idea is to
split the data stream of problematic sensors into several successive intervals, each considered as the
signal from a new virtual sensor, so that an individual’s data is presented only once in each interval.
A MIMO mechanism can then treat such dataset and offers privacy guarantees. This results in
addressing one of the main issues for the applicability of the model proposed in [23, 24]. However,
increasing the number of inputs degrades the privacy guarantees or the output quality that we can
provide. Hence in general no privacy guarantee will be offered to users who activate the same sensor
too frequently. Second, the magnitude of his contribution to the dataset must be bounded by ki, but
this is not really problematic in applications such as motion detection, where we can typically take
ki = 1.
Sensitivity
In order to reduce the impact of differential privacy on the performance of one application, we must
evaluate as precisely as possible the amount of noise necessary to make a mechanism differentially
private. For this purpose, the following quantity based on the sensitivity Definition 2 plays an
important role.
Definition 3. The `2-sensitivity of a system G with m inputs and p outputs with respect to the
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adjacency relation Adj is defined by
∆
m,p
2 G = sup
Adj(u,u’)
‖Gu −Gu′‖2 = sup
Adj(u,u’)
‖G(u − u′)‖2,
where by definition ‖Gv‖22 =
∑∞
t=−∞ |[Gv]t|2 and |x| =
(∑p
k=1 |xk|2
)1/2
is also used throughout the
thesis to denote the Euclidean norm for x in Rp or Cp.
Then recalling Theorem 3, we conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let G be a system with m inputs and p outputs, and with `2-sensitivity ∆m,p2 G with res-
pect to an adjacency relation Adj. Then the mechanism M(u) = Gu+w, where w is a p-dimensional
Gaussian white noise with covariance matrix κ2δ,(∆
m,p
2 G)
2Ip, is (, δ)-differentially private with res-
pect to Adj.
We see that the required additive noise to release a differentially private version of signal Gu is
proportional to the `2-sensitivity of the filter and to κδ, , which can be shown to behave roughly
as O(ln(1/δ))1/2/. Note that we must inject noise to each output proportional to the sensitivity
of the whole filter G, even if G was diagonal say, otherwise trivial linkage attacks that simply
average a sufficient number of outputs could potentially detect the presence of an individual with
high probability. Finally, the differentially private mechanism for our original problem could be
obtained by simply adding a sufficient amount of noise proportional to the sensitivity of our desired
filter F, to the output of the filter. In next section, we discuss computing the sensitivity of filter F
in details.
3.4 Sensitivity Calculations
We first recall the H2 norm of an LTI system with m inputs which plays an important role for the
following sensitivity calculations.
‖G‖22 =
m∑
i=1
‖Gδ0ei‖22 =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Tr(G∗(e jω)G(e jω))dω.
Note from the frequency domain definition that writing G(z) = [Gi j(z)]i, j for the p × m transfer
matrix, we have
‖G‖22 =
∑
i, j
‖Gi j‖22.
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3.4.1 Sensitivity for the SIMO and Diagonal Cases
Generalizing the single-input single-output scenario considered in [26] to the case of a system with
m = 1 but possibly multiple outputs (SIMO), we have immediately the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (SIMO LTI system). Let G be a stable LTI system with one input and p outputs. For
the adjacency relation (3.1),
∆
1,p
2 G = k1‖G‖2,
where ‖G‖2 is theH2 norm of G.
Proof. We have immediately
‖G(u − u′)‖22 = |α1|2‖Gδt1‖22
≤ k21‖G‖22,
and the bound is attained if |α1| = k1. 
For a MIMO system, the case where G is diagonal, i.e., its transfer matrix is
G(z) = diag(G11(z), . . . ,Gmm(z)),
also leads to a simple sensitivity computation. Note that in this case, we have ‖G‖22 =
∑m
i=1 ‖Gii‖2.
Theorem 6 (Diagonal LTI system). Let G be a stable diagonal LTI system with m inputs and
outputs. For the adjacency relation (3.1),
∆m,m2 G = ‖GK‖2 =
 m∑
i=1
‖kiGii‖22
1/2 ,
where K = diag(k1, . . . , km).
Proof. If G is diagonal, then for u and u’ adjacent, we have from (3.2)
‖G(u − u′)‖22 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
i=1
αiGδtiei
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
= ‖col(α1g11 ∗ δt1 , . . . , αmgmm ∗ δtm)‖22,
where col(x1, . . . xm) denotes a signal with values in Rm if each xi is a scalar signal. Here gii denotes
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the impulse response of Gii. Hence
‖G(u − u′)‖22 =
m∑
i=1
‖αigii ∗ δti‖22
=
m∑
i=1
|αi|2‖Gii‖22,
and |αi| ≤ ki, for all i. Again the bound is attained if |αi| = ki for all i. 
The sensitivity calculations for MISO or general MIMO systems are no longer straightforward,
because the impulses on the various input channels, obtained from the difference of two adjacent
signals u, u′, could possibly influence any given output. Still, the following result provides a simple
bound on the sensitivity which will be used later for mechanism optimization.
3.4.2 Upper and Lower Bound for the general MIMO Case
Theorem 7. Let G be an LTI system with m× p transfer matrix G(z) = [G1(z), . . . ,Gm(z)] (i.e., with
columns Gi), such that ‖G‖2 < ∞. For the adjacency relation (3.1),
‖GK‖2 ≤ ∆m,p2 G ≤ |k|‖G‖2,
where K = diag(k1, . . . , km) and |k| =
(∑m
i=1 k
2
i
)1/2
.
Proof. We have
G(u − u′) =
m∑
i=1
αi Gδtiei,
and moreover ‖G‖22 =
∑m
i=1 ‖Gδtiei‖22 by definition. For the upper bound, we can write
‖G(u − u′)‖2 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
i=1
αi Gδtiei
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
m∑
i=1
|αi|‖Gδtiei‖2
≤ |k|
 m∑
i=1
‖Gδtiei‖22
1/2 ,
where the last inequality results from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. For the lower bound, let us
first take u′ ≡ 0. Then consider an adjacent signal with a single discrete impulse on input channel i
of height ki at time ti, i = 1, . . . ,m, with t1 < t2 < . . . < tm. Let η > 0. Since ‖G‖2 < ∞, ‖Giui‖2 < ∞,
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and hence |(Giui)t| → 0 as t → ∞. Hence by taking ti+1 − ti large enough for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1,
i.e., waiting for the effect of impulse i on the output to be sufficiently small, we can obtain a signal
u such that
‖Gu‖22 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
i=1
Giui
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≥
m∑
i=1
k2i ‖Gδtiei‖22 − η.
Since this is true for any η > 0 and ‖Gδtiei‖22 = ‖Gi‖22, we get (∆m,p2 G)2 ≥ ‖GK‖22 =
∑m
i=1 k
2
i ‖Gi‖2. 
For this case, we assume k1 = . . . = km, the upper bound on the sensitivity is k1‖G‖2√m. The
squared sensitivity, which is related to the variance of the required amount of privacy-preserving
noise in an output perturbation scheme, scales then linearly with the number of inputs. We can
contrast this bound to the situation where G is diagonal, in which case the sensitivity is exactly
k1‖G‖2 from Theorem 6. Moreover, the following example shows that the upper bound of Theorem
7 cannot be improved for the general MISO or MIMO case.
Example 1. Consider the MISO system G(z) = [G11(z), . . . ,G1m(z)], with g1i = δτi the impulse
response of G1i, for some times τ1, . . . , τm. Then ‖G‖22 = m. Now let u′ ≡ 0 and u =
∑m
i=1 δtiei, so
that u and u′ are adjacent, with k1 = . . . = km = 1, and moreover let us choose the times ti such
that τi + ti is a constant, i.e., take ti = κ − τi for some κ ≥ maxi{τi}. Then Gu = ∑mi=1 g1i ∗ ui = mδκ,
and so ‖Gu‖22 = m2. This shows that the bound of Theorem 7 is tight in this case. Note that this
happens because all the events of the signal u influence the output at the same time. Indeed, if the
times τi + ti are all distinct, then we get ‖Gu‖22 = m.
3.4.3 Exact solution for the MIMO Case
For completeness, we give in this subsection an exact expression for the sensitivity of a MIMO
filter. Let G be a stable LTI system with m inputs and p outputs, and state space representation
xt+1 = Axt + But (3.3)
yt = Cxt + Dut.
Recall the definition of the observability Gramian P0, which is the unique positive semi-definite
solution of the equation
AT P0A − P0 + CTC = 0.
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Let Bi,Di be the ith column of the matrix B and D respectively, for i = 1, . . . ,m. Finally, define for
i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, i , j, and τ in Z
S τi j = (3.4)
BTi (A
τ−1)TCT D j + BTi (A
τ)T P0B j, if τ > 0
DTi D j + B
T
i P0B j, if τ = 0
DTi CA
|τ|−1B j + BTi P0A
|τ|B j, if τ < 0.
Theorem 8. Let G be a stable LTI system with m inputs and p outputs, and state space representa-
tion (3.3). Then, for the adjacency relation (3.1),
(∆m,p2 G)
2 = ‖GK‖22 +
m∑
i, j=1
i, j
kik j
 sup
ti,t j∈N
∣∣∣∣S ti−t ji j ∣∣∣∣ . (3.5)
Proof. In view of (3.2), we have
∆
m,p
2 G = sup|αi |≤ki,ti≥0
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
m∑
i=1
αiGδtiei
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
For yi = Gδtiei and y =
∑m
i=1 αiyi, we have
‖y‖22 =
∞∑
t=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
αiyi,t
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i=1
α2i |yi,t|2 +
∞∑
t=0
m∑
i, j=1
i, j
αiα jyTi,ty j,t
≤ ‖GK‖22 +
m∑
i, j=1
i, j
kik j
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
t=0
yTi,ty j,t
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where K = diag(k1, . . . , km) and the bound can be attained by taking αi ∈ {−ki, ki}, depending on
the sign of S i j :=
∑∞
t=0 y
T
i,ty j,t.
Next, we derive the more explicit expression of S i j given in the theorem. First,
yi,t =

0, t < ti,
Di, t = ti
CAt−ti−1Bi, t > ti.
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Assume without loss of generality that t1 ≤ t2 ≤ . . . ≤ tm. Then if ti = t j, we find that
S i j = DTi D j + B
T
i P0B j,
with P0 =
∑∞
t=0(A
t)TCTCAt the observability Gramian. If ti < t j, then
S i j = BTi (A
t j−ti−1)TCT D j + BTi (A
t j−ti)T P0B j.
The case ti > t j is symmetric.

3.4.4 Discussion
In the expression (3.5) another maximization over the inter-event times ti− t j still need to be carried
out. This optimization depends on the parameters of system G. Therefore, this result could not be
directly used in more advanced mechanism optimization schemes, such as the one discussed in the
next section. However this could be used to evaluate carefully the amount of noise necessary in an
output perturbation mechanism.
For example, the expression (3.5) provides some intuition about the way the MIMO system dynam-
ics influence its sensitivity. Note from the expression of S τi j in (3.4) that one way of decreasing the
sensitivity of G is to increase sufficiently the required time |ti− t j| between the events contributed by
a single user, in order for ‖A|ti−t j |‖ to be small enough. For example, a lower bound on inter-event
times in different streams could be enforced in the adjacency relation, which would weaken the
differential privacy guarantee but help design mechanisms with better performance.
3.5 Zero-Forcing MIMO Mechanisms
Using the sensitivity calculations above, we can now design differentially private mechanisms to
approximate a given filter F, as discussed in Section 3.3.1. The mechanisms described below ge-
neralize to the MIMO case some ideas introduced in [26]. Indeed, the general approximation ar-
chitecture considered, described on Fig. 3.1, is the same as for the SISO case. On this figure, the
system H is of the form H = FL, with L a left inverse of the pre-filter G. We call the resulting
mechanisms Zero-Forcing Equalization (ZFE) mechanisms. The goal is to design G (and hence,
H) so that the Mean-Squared Error (MSE) between y and yˆ on Fig. 3.1 is minimized. In order to
obtain a differentially private signal v, the Gaussian white noise signal w has its standard deviation
proportional to the sensitivity of the filter G. It was shown in [26] that this setup can allow signi-
ficant performance improvements compared to the output-perturbation mechanism. Note that the
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latter can be recovered when G = F and H is the identity.
3.5.1 SIMO system approximation
First, let us assume that F is a SIMO filter, with p outputs. Note that this scenario is conside-
red in [28] (from a very different point of view) for the special case where each row of F is
a moving average filter with a different size for the averaging window. Consider a first stage
G(z) = col(G1(z), . . . ,Gq(z)) taking the input signal u and producing q intermediate outputs that
must be perturbed. The second stage is taken to be H = FL, with L(z) = [L1(z), . . . , Lq(z)] a left-
inverse of G, i.e., satisfying
q∑
i=1
Li(z)Gi(z) = 1.
Let us also define the transfer functions Mi, i = 1, . . . , q, such that Mi(z) = Li(z−1), hence Mi(e jω) =
L(e jω)∗, and thus in particular
|Mi(e jω)|2 = |Li(e jω)|2, i = 1, . . . , q, (3.6)
and
q∑
i=1
Mi(e jω)∗Gi(e jω) = 1. (3.7)
From Theorem 5, the sensitivity of the first stage for input signals that are adjacent according
to (3.1) is k1‖G‖2. Using Theorem 4, adding a white Gaussian noise w to the output of G with
covariance matrix k21κ
2
δ,‖G‖22Iq is sufficient to ensure that the signal v on Fig. 3.1 is differentially
private. The MSE for this mechanism can be expressed as
ξ(G) = lim
T→∞
1
T
∞∑
t=0
E
[
‖(Fu)t − (FLGu)t − (FLw)t‖22
]
ξ(G) = lim
T→∞
1
T
∞∑
t=0
E
[
‖(FLw)t‖22
]
ξ(G) = k21κ
2
δ,‖G‖22‖FL‖22.
We are thus led to consider the minimization of ‖FL‖22‖G‖22 over the pre-filters G. Recall in the
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Figure 3.1 Approximation setup for differentially private filtering. w is a noise signal guaranteeing
that v is a differentially private signal. The signal yˆ is differentially private no matter what the
system H is, see [Theorem 3].
following calculation that | · | is also used to denote the Euclidean norm in Cd, for any d. We have
‖FL‖22‖G‖22
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(L∗(e jω)F∗(e jω)F(e jω)L(e jω))dω×
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(G∗(e jω)G(e jω))dω
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|F(e jω)|2|L(e jω)|2dω × 1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|G(e jω)|2dω
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|F(e jω)|2|M(e jω)|2dω × 1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|G(e jω)|2dω,
where in the last equality we used (3.6). Now consider on the space of 2pi-periodic functions with
values in Cq the inner product
〈 f , g〉 = 1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
f (e jω)∗g(e jω)dω.
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for this inner product applied to the functionsω 7→ |F(e jω)|M(e jω)
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and ω 7→ G(e jω), we obtain the following bound
‖FL‖22‖G‖22 ≥ 12pi
∫ pi
−pi
|F(e jω)|
q∑
i=1
M∗i (e
jω)Gi(e jω)dω
2 ,
i.e., using (3.7),
‖FL‖22‖G‖22 ≥
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|F(e jω)| dω
)2
.
Moreover, the two sides in the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality are equal, i.e., the bound is attained, if
|F(e jω)|M(e jω) = G(e jω).
Note that this condition does not depend on q. Hence we can simply take q = 1, and L(z) = 1/G(z),
to get
|F(e jω)|L∗(e jω) = G(e jω)
i.e., |G(e jω)|2 = |F(e jω)|. (3.8)
Finding G SISO satisfying (3.8) is a spectral factorization problem. We can choose G stable and
minimum phase, so that its inverse is also stable. The following theorem summarizes the preceding
discussion and generalizes [16, Theorem 8].
Theorem 9. Let F be a SIMO LTI system with ‖F‖2 < ∞. We have, for any LTI system G,
ξ(G) ≥ k21κ2δ,
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|F(e jω)|dω
)2
, (3.9)
where |F(e jω)| =
(∑p
i=1 |Fi1(e jω)|2
)1/2
. If moreover F satisfies the Paley-Wiener condition 12pi
∫ pi
−pi ln |F(
e jω)| dω > −∞, this lower bound on the mean-squared error of the ZFE mechanism can be attained
by some minimum phase SISO system G such that |G(e jω)|2 = |F(e jω)|, for almost every ω ∈ [−pi, pi).
3.5.2 MIMO system approximation
Let us now assume that F has m > 1 inputs. We write F(z) = [F1(z), . . . , Fm(z)], with Fi a p × 1
transfer matrix. In this case, in view of the complicated expression (3.5) for the sensitivity of a
general MIMO filter, we only provide a subpotimal ZFE mechanism, together with a comparison
between the performance of our mechanism and the optimal ZFE mechanism. The idea is to restrict
our attention to pre-filters G that are m × m and diagonal, for which the sensitivity is given in
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Theorem 6. The problem of optimizing the diagonal pre-filters, using the architecture depicted on
Fig. 3.2, can in fact be seen as designing m SIMO mechanisms.
Diagonal Pre-filter Optimization
If G is diagonal, then according to Theorem 6 its squared sensitivity is (∆m,m2 G)
2 = ‖KG‖22 =∑m
i=1 ‖kiGii‖22, with K = diag(k1, . . . , km). Following the same reasoning as in the previous subsec-
tion, the MSE for this mechanism can be expressed as
ξ(G) = κ2δ,‖KG‖22‖FG−1‖22,
with G−1(z) = diag(G11(z)−1, . . . ,Gmm(z)−1). Now remark that
‖FG−1‖22 =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
m∑
i=1
|Fi(e jω)|2
|Gii(e jω)|2 dω.
Hence from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality again, we obtain the lower bound
ξ(G) ≥ κ2δ,
 12pi
∫ pi
−pi
m∑
i=1
|Fi(e jω)|
|Gii(e jω)| |kiGii(e
jω)|dω
2
ξ(G) ≥ κ2δ,
 12pi
∫ pi
−pi
m∑
i=1
ki|Fi(e jω)|dω
2 ,
and this bound is attained if
ki|Gii(e jω)| = |Fi(e
jω)|
|Gii(e jω)| ,
i.e. ki|Gii(e jω)|2 = |Fi(e jω)|, i = 1, . . . ,m.
In other words, the best diagonal pre-filter for the MIMO ZFE mechanism can be obtained from m
spectral factorizations of the functions ω 7→ 1ki |Fi(e jω)|, i = 1, . . . ,m.
Theorem 10. Let F = [F1, . . . , Fm] be a MIMO LTI system with ‖F‖2 < ∞. We have, for any
diagonal filter G(z) = diag(G11(z), . . . ,Gmm(z)),
ξ(G) ≥ κ2δ,
 12pi
∫ pi
−pi
m∑
i=1
ki|Fi(e jω)|2dω
2 . (3.10)
If moreover each Fi satisfies the Paley-Wiener condition 12pi
∫ pi
−pi ln |Fi(e jω)| dω > −∞, this lower
bound on the mean-squared error of the ZFE mechanism can be attained by some minimum phase
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Figure 3.2 (Suboptimal) ZFE mechanism for a MIMO system Fu =
∑m
i=1 Fiui, and a diagonal pre-
filter G(z) = diag(G11(z), . . . ,Gmm(z)). Here Fi(z) is a p × 1 transfer matrix, for i = 1, . . . ,m. The
signal w is a white Gaussian noise with covariance matrix κ2δ,‖KG‖22Im.
systems Gii such that |Gii(e jω)|2 = |Fi(e jω)|, for almost every ω ∈ [−pi, pi).
Comparison with Non-Diagonal Pre-filters
For F a general MIMO system, it is possible that we could achieve better performance with a
ZFE mechanism where G is not diagonal, i.e., by combining the inputs before adding the privacy-
preserving noise. Here we provide another lower bound on the MSE that one could expect by
carrying out this more involved optimization over general pre-filters G rather than just diagonal
pre-filters. To simplify the discussion, we assume k1 = . . . = km = 1.
Hence consider a general m × m pre-filter G with left inverse L. With the lower bound of Theorem
7, designing a ZFE mechanism based on sensitivity as above would require adding a noise with
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variance at least κ2δ,‖G‖22. This would lead to an MSE at least equal to κ2δ,‖G‖22‖FL‖22. Now note that
‖FL‖22 =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(F(e jω)L(e jω)L(e jω)∗F(e jω)∗)dω
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(F(e jω)∗F(e jω)L(e jω)L(e jω)∗)dω
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(A(e jω)2L(e jω)L(e jω)∗)dω
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(A(e jω)L(e jω)L(e jω)∗A(e jω))dω,
where for all ω, A(e jω) is the positive-semidefinite square root of F(e jω)∗F(e jω), i.e., A(e jω)2 =
F(e jω)∗F(e jω). Then, once again from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
‖G‖22‖FL‖22 =
[
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(G(e jω)∗G(e jω))dω
]
×
[
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(A(e jω)L(e jω)L(e jω)∗A(e jω))dω
]
‖G‖22‖FL‖22 ≥
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Tr(A(e jω)L(e jω)G(e jω))dω
)2
ξ(G) ≥ κ2δ,
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
‖F(e jω)‖∗dω
)2
, (3.11)
where ‖F(e jω)‖∗ = Tr(A(e jω)) denotes the nuclear norm of the matrix F(e jω) (sum of singular va-
lues). The lower bound (3.11) on the achievable MSE with a general pre-filter in a ZFE mechanism
should be compared to the performance (3.10) that we obtained with diagonal pre-filters (with
ki = 1 here). Note that these bounds indeed coïncide for m = 1.
3.6 Example : Estimation of Building Occupancy
In this section we illustrate some of the ideas discussed above in the context of an application to
estimating and forecasting occupancy in an office building equipped with motion detection sensors.
As mentioned in Section 3.3.2, such an application raises privacy concerns related to the possibility
that some occupants could be tracked individually from the published information, correlated pos-
sibly with public information such as the location of their office. The dataset used here comes from
a sensor network experiment carried out in the Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratories (MERL)
and described in [2] and on Fig. 3.3.
The original dataset contains the traces of more than 200 sensors spread over two floors of a buil-
ding, where each sensor recorded with millisecond accuracy over several months the exact times
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Figure 3: The floor plan of the experimental area. O ces are mostly on the
outside of the building. The areas observed by sensors (shaded) are hallways,
lobbies, and meeting rooms.
0118.txt.gz May 24 05:46:40 2007 – Jul 2 15:41:50 2007
The filename refers to the high-order bits of the timestamps on the data
contained in each file.
The files contain data like this:
470 01179980510828 01179980511853 1.0
469 01179980512169 01179980513193 1.0
467 01179980513580 01179980514609 1.0
468 01179980514573 01179980515598 1.0
The first element is the sensor identification number. The second and third
numbers are the timestamps of the beginning of the event. The fourth number
is a meaningless place holder value.
The map in Figure 3 depicts the test area. Executives and administrators
occupy the wing on the right right side of the eighth floor map. Researchers
occupy the bottom and left wings, and most of the 7th floor. The central core
of the building contains restrooms, lobbies, elevators, and on the eighth floor,
the mail room and the kitchen. There are several stairwells that connect the
floors.
We have been collecting data at this facility since October of 2005. Data
from the entire area depicted on that map has been continuously recorded since
March 2006. The system generates approximately two million motion detections
per month.
MERL-TR2007-069 November 2007
Figure 3.3 Floorplan of the part of the MERL building used for the sensor network experiment
in [2]. The shaded areas are hallways, lobbies and meeting rooms equipped with more than 200
motion detectors, placed a few meters apart and recording events roughly every second.
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at which they detected some motion. For illustration purposes we subsampled the dataset in space
and time, summing all the events recorded by several sufficiently close sensors over 5 minute in-
tervals. We formed in this way 10 input signals ui, i = 1, . . . , 10, corresponding to 10 spatial zones
(each zone covered by a group of several sensors), with a discrete-time period corresponding to 5
minutes, and ui,t being the number of events detected by all the sensors in group i during period t.
If us assume say that during a given discrete-time period, a single individual can activate at most
2 sensors in any group, then ki = 2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 25. If moreover we assume that any individual
travels through at most 5 zones, then we could add a constraint
∑10
i=1 ki ≤ 10. Finally we need to as-
sume that a single individual only activates a group of sensor once over the time interval for which
we wish to provide differential privacy. Section 3.3.2 discussed how to relax this requirement by
splitting the input data.
As an illustrative example, we could be interested in a system computing simultaneously and in
real-time the following three outputs :
– The sum of the moving averages over the past 30 min for zones 1 to 4.
– The sum of the moving averages over the past 1 h for zones 3 to 7.
– A forecast (prediction) of the total number of events detected in the next 20 minutes in all zones,
provided by an ARMAX model [29] (with 10 inputs and one output) calibrated using one part of
the dataset.
Hence our desired filter has the structure
F =

∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
 , (3.12)
where ∗ denotes a non-zero transfer function. Fig. 3.4 shows a sample path over a 25 h period of
the 3rd output for a predictive ARMAX model that we designed, as well as a differentially-private
version obtained from the diagonal pre-filter optimization procedure of Section 3.5.2 applied to the
whole filter F. Notice on the figure that the approach used here relying on the notion of sensitivity
requires a noise level independent of the size of the desired output signal, hence low signal values
tend to be easily buried in the noise.
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CHAPITRE 4 DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE TRAFFIC STATE ESTIMATION
4.1 Introduction
Managing traffic by means of road traffic information systems could resolve one of the major con-
cerns in urban areas, namely, traffic congestion . This phenomenon is responsible for the heavy
costs linked to lost time, fuel consumption and increased pollution. One of the most important
strategy implemented in traffic information systems to avoid unnecessary costs of developing new
expensive infrastructures is to apply real-time control policies for demand management. These
strategies can be enabled by proliferation of swarms of sensors a long the highways to provide an
accurate picture of the traffic state over time. According to the vast literature on traffic estima-
tion, such traffic state estimators mainly use the traffic data obtained from inductive loop detectors
embedded in the highway. However, the detailed data from these detectors could be linked to
some external information in order to establish presence or absence of individuals contributing this
data. The main privacy concern with designing the traffic systems services is the possibility of
reconstructing the trajectory of a given person by linking the vast sources of side information to
the aggregated data, e.g, real-time traffic density maps, published by the traffic estimators. This
chapter aims at designing a traffic state estimator with a privacy-preserving scheme relying on the
notion of differential privacy. The scheme presented in this thesis relies on both the microscopic
data originating from the participants and a macroscopic model of the aggregate dynamics, namely
the cell transmission model (CTM) [30].
Briefly, CTM anticipates macroscopic traffic behavior on a given highway in time by evaluating
traffic parameters (flow and density) at a finite number of intermediate points at different time steps
[30]. This procedure is done by dividing the highway into homogeneous sections (cells) and eval-
uating the discrete model of traffic flow dynamics at each cell continuously. The cell transmission
model together with the measurements data obtained from single loop detectors are then assimi-
lated through an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF), which provides a traffic density map of the spatial
interval of interest [30]. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a
brief background on privacy preserving traffic state estimators and the main motivations behind our
work. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 present some background on the traffic flow model and the measure-
ment models for the data originating from single-loop detectors which are necessary to develop a
model-based traffic state estimator. Section 4.5 introduces our method for traffic state estimation,
built around an extended Kalman filter and a traffic mode estimator. Section 4.6 describes our pri-
vate mode and density measurement model. Finally, the overall architecture of our private traffic
estimator and the constructed private density map are presented in Section 4.7 . We also compare
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our results to those presented in [3].
4.2 Background
The problem of designing a differentially private traffic density estimator is initially addressed in
[3]. The main drawback of this scheme is to leak the participants information as the number of the
sensors ( or correspondingly the length of the spatial interval of interest) increases. The mechanism
proposed in [3] provides differential privacy guarantee which is inversely related to the number of
the sensors reporting the traffic data. For example, for a road equipped with m single loop detectors
and any choice of  and δ, the architecture would present a traffic density map with (M + , δ)-
differential privacy guarantee. In particular this chapter is inspired by [3] and aims at designing a
privacy preserving traffic estimator such that the differential privacy guarantee provided to the users
data becomes independent of the number of the sensors from which measurements are obtained.
Our result entails a strict improvement over the state-of-the-art: we propose an architecture that
could monitor the traffic status continuously with (2, 2δ)-differential privacy guarantee where 
and δ are chosen by the designer. Furthermore, our mechanism design allows that a big part of
the dataset remain non-randomized. This distinguishing feature of the mechanism helps reduce the
degradation in estimation performance.
4.3 Traffic Flow Dynamics
The unidirectional traffic along a single road section, with position denoted x and for varying num-
ber of lanes λ(x) can be mapped based on the traffic flow dynamics [31]
q(x, t) = ρ(x, t)v(x, t)
where ρ is the vehicle density (say, in vehicles per mile) over all lanes, q is the traffic flow over all
lanes, and v is the traffic velocity. We then consider the simplest situation, assuming a homogeneous
road section [31]. The continuity equation reads
∂ρ
∂t
+
∂(ρv)
∂x
= 0 (4.1)
We consider instead its discrete version, assuming the road section has been divided into cells of
length ∆xi and a time step of ∆t [31]. The density in cell i over all lanes follows the recursion
ρi(t + ∆t) = ρi(t) +
∆t
∆xi
(Ftot(ρi−1(t), ρi(t)) − Ftot(ρi(t), ρi+1(t)) (4.2)
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where Ftot(ρi−1(t), ρi(t)) is the total so-called numerical flux enters cell i [30] (i.e., through the
interface i − 1 → i) during period ∆t, and Ftot(ρi(t), ρi+1(t)) is the total numerical flux out of the
cell i (i.e., through the interface i → i + 1). Note here that the numerical flux Ftot(ρi(t), ρi+1(t)) is
different in general from the total flow q(xi|i+1, t), where xi|i+1 denotes the location of the interface
between cells i and i + 1. More details are provided below.
To complete the model, we need to make an hypothesis on the relationship between two quantities,
e.g., between velocity and density, or between flow and density. In order to fulfil this objective,
we first introduce lane-averaged, also called effective, quantities, i.e., lane-averaged traffic density
ρ(x, t) (say, in vehicles per mile per lane), lane-averaged traffic speed v(x, t), and lane-averaged
traffic flow q(x, t) = ρ(x, t)v(x, t) [31, Chapter 7]. Denoting by ρ j(x, t), q j(x, t) and v j(x, t) the
density, speed and flow in lane j at a position x, we have the relations
ρ(x, t) =
∑λ(x)
j=1 ρ j(x, t)
λ(x)
, q(x, t) =
∑λ(x)
j=1 q j(x, t)
λ(x)
, v(x, t) =
∑λ(x)
j=1 v j(x, t)
λ(x)
We then adopt the simplest approach based on the first order model which considers a static re-
lationship q(ρ), also called a fundamental diagram. In first-order models, proposed initially by
Lighthill and Whitham [32] and independently by Richards [33] (LWR models), the effective den-
sity is a fundamental quantity and a sufficient description of the local traffic state, since the effective
speed and thus also the effective flow are assumed to be known static functions of density [3]. Note
that LWR models assume that the traffic flow is always in local equilibrium with respect to the den-
sity, and leads to the formation of physically impossible phenomena such as shock waves. Here, we
work for concreteness with triangular fundamental diagrams, which are arguably the most popular
in practice. Next we describe the resulting LWR model which is also called the Cell-Transmission
Model (CTM) [30].
4.3.1 Cell Transmission Model
The simplest LWR model, called the cell-transmission model, uses a triangular fundamental dia-
gram
q(ρ) =
v fρ i f ρ ≤ ρcw(ρmax − ρ) i f ρc ≤ ρ ≤ ρmax (4.3)
Here v f is the velocity of free traffic (say 110km/h for a highway), ρmaxis the maximum density on
this road segment (say 120 vehicles/lane/km for a highway) and ρc is the critical density at which the
maximum flow qmax = v fρc is attained. Note that w is the velocity of the waves of density variations
in congested traffic (which propagate backwards). Fig. 4.1 illustrates these definitions[31].
Dividing the road into I cells numbered 1, ..., I, the discrete-time lane-averaged conservation law
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Figure 4.1 Triangular fundamental diagram and associated parameters
for vehicles corresponding to the solution q(ρ) of equation ( 4.1 ) is
ρik+1 = ρ
i
k +
∆t
∆xi
(
λi−1
λi
F(ρi−1k , ρ
i
k) − F(ρik, ρi+1k )), for i = 1, ..., I
where ρik is the lane-averaged vehicle density in cell i at period k, i.e., during the time interval
[k∆t, (k + 1)∆t], and F(ρik, ρ
i+1
k ) is the lane-averaged numerical flux out of the cell i (i.e.,through the
interface i → i + 1) during period k. We also define λi to be the number of lanes at the interface
i → i + 1. Any location where the number of lanes changes is always assumed to fall inside a
cell. This leads to a dynamical system with non-linear (piecewise linear) dynamics. At the end of
the road for which we are estimating the traffic, we add two ghost cells 0 and I + 1 to enforce the
boundary conditions. We assume that we have loop detectors at the exit of cell 0 and at the entrance
of cell I + 1, in order to enforce the boundary conditions[30]. Then, the following stochastic state-
space model of the density dynamics on the road is obtained
ρik+1 = ρ
i
k +
∆t
∆xi
(
λi−1
λi
F(ρi−1k , ρ
i
k) − F(ρik, ρi+1k )) + γik, for i = 1, ..., I (4.4)
Here γik is a Gaussian random variable, whose variance can be tuned later on in the design of the
state estimator, based on the relative confidence we place in the model or the observations. The
dynamics of the ghost cells are also
ρ0k+1 = ρ
0
k + γ
0
k , ρ
I+1
k+1 = ρ
I+1
k + γ
I+1
k (4.5)
Finally, for the triangular fundamental (4.3), the standard numerical method, the Godunov method,
corresponds to using the following numerical flux in (4.4):
F(ρik, ρ
i+1
k ) = min(ρ
i
kv f , ρcv f ,w(ρmax − ρi+1k )) (4.6)
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4.3.2 Extended Kalman Filter
As noted in introduction, the stochastic state-space model 4.4 together with the measurements
reported by single-loop detectors (Section 4.4 ), could be assimilated in an extended Kalman filter
(EKF) to construct our traffic density map. Here, we present a very short introduction to the EKF.
Consider the following non-linear stochastic state space system.
xk+1 = F(xk) + ωk k ∈ Z+ (4.7)
yk = H(xk) + νk (4.8)
where x0 ∼ N(0,Σ) and that x0 is independent of the system disturbance process ω and the obser-
vation noise process ν. For these two we also assume ω
ν
 ∼ N  00
 ,  Q 00 R

A popular approach to the stochastic state estimation for system ( 4.7 ) is the extended Kalman fil-
ter (see e.g. Chapter 13, [34]). Subject to the assumption that F and H have continuous first order
partial derivatives, one may recursively employ the Taylor series expansion of F and H to obtain
linear approximations of the system dynamics process and observations process in the neighbour-
hood of the time varying trajectory xk, k ∈ Z+. Henceforth, this assumption will be adopted without
further comment. Carrying out this first order approximation for F(xk) the estimated state xˆk could
be obtained with the following conditioning and prediction steps.
Conditioning step:
xˆk = xk|k−1 + VkHTk
[
HkVkHTk + R
]−1 (
yk − H(xk|k−1))
Prediction step:
Vk+1 = FkVkFTk − FTk HTk
[
HkVkHTk + R
]−1
HkFk + Q
where
xk+1|k = F(xˆk), V0 = Σ, Fk =
[
∂F(x)
∂x
]
|x=xˆk , Hk =
[
∂H(x)
∂x
]
|x=xk|k−1
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4.4 Single Loop Detector Measurement Model
The datasets provided by the flow sensors consist of sequences of counts cij,k,and occupancies o
i
j,k
for k ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ S ,0 ≤ j ≤ λi . Here k represents the period (T = 30s), S is the number
of single loop detectors reporting the records, and j determines the lane number. The occupancy
0 ≤ oij,k ≤ 1 is a unit less number representing the percentage of period k for which a vehicle was
passing in front of sensor i. Since single loop detectors cannot measure traffic density or velocity
at their location, their measurements must be used to obtain an estimation of these quantities. For
let’s say a one-lane road equipped with a number of single loop detectors, these estimations are
v j(t) ≈ g c j(t)o j(t)T , q j(t) ≈
c j(t)
T
, ρ j(t) ≈ o j(t)g (4.9)
where T is the time period of the sensor and g is the so-called g-factor, which is the average effective
vehicle length at the sensor location that can vary with time. Similar to [3], to get a more robust
approximation of density, we first form the approximate flows based on the counts data. That is,
the flow φik around the sensor placed at the interface i→ i + 1 for cells i and i + 1 is defined by the
non-linear measurement model
φik :=
1
λiT
λi∑
j=1
cij,k = F(ρ
i
k, ρ
i+1
k ) + νk (4.10)
where νk is a Gaussian random variable describing the measurement errors. The density pseudo-
measurement model is then defined as
zik = z
i+1
k =

φik
v f
i f mik = F
ρmax − φ
i
k
w i f m
i
k = C
(4.11)
where mik is the traffic mode for the interface, either free (F) or congested (C) corresponding to
ρ ≤ ρc and ρ ≥ ρc. In fact, this model is obtained by inverting our triangular fundamental diagram
presented in ( 4.3 ). The observation signal zik is related simply to the density of the flow as
zik = z
i+1
k = ρ
i
k + η
i
k = ρ
i+1
k + η
i+1
k (4.12)
where ηik, η
i+1
k are assumed to be Gaussian random variables. However, this model requires deter-
mining the exact mode of the traffic flow. The strategy proposed in [3] to find the mode of the traffic
is to use the reported occupancy measurements to estimate the mode of the traffic either fluid or
congested, which corresponds to o jg ≤ ρc or o jg > ρc respectively.
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However, these traffic mode measurements can result in frequent mode estimation errors due sim-
ply to an inaccurate estimation of g-factor. With 18-foot long autos and 60-foot long trucks, the
g-factor parameter is expected to range from 18 feet for inner, auto-only lanes to as much as 60 feet
in the early morning for outer lanes over fluid highways with heavy truck traffic [35]. Note also
that these mode measurements appear to be difficult to handle from a differential privacy point of
view, because the occupancy time due to a single vehicle, equal to
lv
Tvv
, with lv its length and vv
its speed, can vary widely depending on its speed. As a result, the sensitivity of these occupancy
measurements is high and the standard Gaussian perturbation mechanism leads to more unreliable
measurements, especially at low density [3]. We now present our mode measurement model, which
takes both the occupancy and the count measurements into account to obtain a more reliable esti-
mation of the traffic modes.
4.5 Non-Private Mode and Density Measurements
According to (4.11), to each flow measurement 0 ≤ φik < qmax(4.10) correspond two possible den-
sities on the fundamental diagram. Based on (4.9), we can also form the lane-average contribution
to the density via occupancy measurements as
yik =
1
gλi
λi∑
j=1
oij,k (4.13)
The traffic mode pseudo-measurements can be then obtained as
Mik = M
i+1
k = arg min
mik
(∣∣∣zik(mik) − yik∣∣∣) (4.14)
Actually, model (4.14) estimates the mode either free (F) or congested (C) based on which sub
function in the hybrid function zik(m
i
k) (4.11) is closer to the occupancy contribution to the density y
i
k.
However, this model requires estimating the g-factor precisely to guarantee that the minimum term
in expression (4.14) is correctly chosen. This is problematic, because the g-factor can vary with
time and generally is not easy to estimate. To handle this problem, we now assume that the g-factor
is a constant and stay the same over time, namely 20 feet. We then bound the allowed deviation
between the density pseudo-measurement zik (4.3) and the occupancy contribution to density y
i
k
(4.13) . That is
for some constant g, ∃ζ(g) > 0 s.t. ∣∣∣log[zik] − log[yik]∣∣∣ ≤ ζ(g) ∀i, k (4.15)
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Note that, truncation (4.15) transforms the variation in g-factor into the upper-bound error between
zik and y
i
k, that is ∣∣∣∣∣∣log zikyik
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ζ(g) ≡ 1geζ(g)λi
λi∑
j=1
oij,k ≤ zik ≤
1
g
eζ(g)
λi
λi∑
j=1
oij,k (4.16)
For assumed values of g and ζ(g), we then define the sets
TF =
{(
φik, y
i
k
)
:
∣∣∣∣∣∣log
[
φik
v f
]
− log
[
yik
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ζ(g) ∀i, k
}
(4.17)
TC =
{(
φik, y
i
k
)
:
∣∣∣∣∣∣log
[
ρmax −
φik
w
]
− log
[
yik
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ζ(g) ∀i, k
}
(4.18)
corresponding to the flow φik satisfying our truncation in free mode (F) or congested mode (C)
respectively.
Lemma 11. For any flow φik, defined in (4.10), we have
1TF
(
(φik, y
i
k)
)
1TC
(
(φik, y
i
k)
)
= 1 iff φik ∈
[
wv fρmax
we2ζ(g) + v f
,
we2ζ(g)v fρmax
w + e2ζ(g)v f
]
. (4.19)
Proof. We have
e−ζ(g)
φik
v f
≤ yik ≤ eζ(g)
φik
v f
, for all (φik, y
i
k) ∈ TF (4.20)
e−ζ(g)(ρmax −
φik
w
) ≤ yik ≤ eζ(g)(ρmax −
φik
w
), for all (φik, y
i
k) ∈ TC (4.21)
In view of (4.20),(4.21), we have
TF ∩ TC =
{
(φik, y
i
k) : e
−ζ(g)φ
i
k
v f
≤ eζ(g)(ρmax −
φik
w
) and e−ζ(g)(ρmax −
φik
w
) ≤ eζ(g)φ
i
k
v f
}
and by solving these two inequalities for φik
1TF
(
(φik, y
i
k)
)
1TC
(
(φik, y
i
k)
)
= 1 iff φik ∈
[
wv fρmax
we2ζ(g) + v f
,
we2ζ(g)v fρmax
w + e2ζ(g)v f
]
.

Defining T¯C and T¯F , the complement sets of TC and TF respectively, we could form a traffic mode
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measurement model as
Mik =

F i f 1TF−TC
(
(φik, y
i
k)
)
= 1 : Safe zone Free mode
C i f 1TC−TF
(
(φik, y
i
k)
)
= 1 : Safe zone Congested mode
Mik−r i f
[∏r−1
s=0 1TC∩TF
(
(φik−s, y
i
k−s)
)]
1T¯C∪T¯F
(
(φik−r, y
i
k−r)
)
= 1, r > 0 : Sensitive zone
(4.22)
The mode measurement model (4.22) determines the mode of the traffic with respect to truncation
(4.15), that is, the current mode is either free (F) or congested (C), if the current flow satisfies (4.22)
only in free mode or only in congested mode, respectively. The third case corresponds to the flow
φik ∈
[
wv fρmax
we2ζ(g) + v f
,
we2ζ(g)v fρmax
w + e2ζ(g)v f
]
where the truncation is respected in both traffic modes. For this
case, the strategy adopted here is to take the mode of the last flow φik−r, that is inside one of the
two safe zone in ( 4.22 ). For illustrative purposes, the region corresponding to the flows satisfying
the truncation in one mode on a triangular fundamental diagram is re-presented with a green line
on Fig. 4.2 . We call the region corresponding to these flows, the Safe zone. We also introduce a
Sensitive zone (red line) which illustrates the flows that our model is disable to determine its mode
directly. The parameters related to the fundamental diagram and the model that are used in Fig. 4.2
are v f = 65 mph, w = 11.6 mph, ρmax = 193 vehicles/mile/lane, g = 20 feet and ζ(g) = 0.51 which
is a unit-less parameter. Note that based on (4.16), the choice of ζ(g) = 0.51 will consider g-factor
variations between 12 feet and 33.3 feet. Note also that, our mode measurement model (4.22)
basically estimates the mode of the traffic with respect to the flows falling inside the safe zone.
Although this strategy could reduce the accuracy of the mode measurement, especially for flows
in sensitive zone, we show that such a model can be used efficiently in designing a differentially
private traffic estimator in Section. 4.6 .
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Figure 4.2 Safe zone and Sensitive zone on Triangular Fundamental Diagram for g = 20 feet and
ζ(g) = 0.51. The safe zone is quite large for simulation purposes.
Similar to [3], to obtain a more physically meaningful mode, the mode measurements will then be
filtered through an additional hidden-Markov model (HMM), described as follows. For the state
trajectory Mik defined in (4.22), the actual mode estimate used to invert the fundamental diagram
is introduced by the new state trajectory {sik}k≥0 with sik ∈ {C, F} . The dynamics of sik are simply
described by a Markov chain with a single parameter pi1 = P(sik+1 , s
i
k), describing the probability
with which the mode changes from fluid to congested at that location. This parameter could be es-
timated from historical data. Finally, we introduce a last parameter pi2 = P(mik = s
i
k), which reflects
the confidence we have in the output of the our model. Accordingly, the confidence probability pa-
rameter in HMM is then set with respect to the value of flow data, i.e, this parameter for the flows
located in sensitive zone is much lower than the ones in safe zone. For the non-private estimation,
we could also define the confidence probability as pi2 = P(mik = s
i
k|qik) which is a helpful model for
the sensitive zone flows, indeed, even if Mik−r addresses a wrong mode, the confidence probability
will be set according to the occupancy contribution to the density (4.13) and the (HMM) could cor-
rect the error. The process of providing density measurements from occupancies and counts data is
described in Algorithm. 1.
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1- Calculate flow measurements φik =
1
Tλi
∑λi
j=1 c
i
j,k
2- based on historical data choose a base g-factor, e.g, 20 feet, and
an upper-bound error ζ(g).
3- Specify the corresponding Safe zone and Sensitive zone based on
Theorem. 11.
4- mik = F/C based on the mode measurement model (4.22).
5- Filter mik thorough the HMM filter to obtain the actual mode s
i
k
used to invert the fundamental diagram.
6-
zik = z
i+1
k =

φik
v f
i f sik = F
ρmax −
φik
w
i f sik = C
(4.23)
Algorithm 1: Non-private density measurement
To illustrate our approach, we estimate the traffic state from induction loop data available as part
of the Mobile Century experiment dataset [36]. This data consists of counts and occupancy mea-
surements from single loop detectors, for each lane of Interstate 880 (Northbound) in California
between post-mile 16.5 and 27.7, i.e., along an approximately 11 mile road segment. The density
measurements based on Algorithm 1 is then assimilated in an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) to
construct our non-private density map.
Fig. 4.3 presents the performance of our non-private estimator. The results are greatly similar to the
map presented in Fig. 4.4 which is the non-private map introduced by [3]. This similarity proves
the reliability of our mode measurement model. The two maps have some discrepancies mainly in
the areas where the traffic is about to switch between the modes. It can be claimed that Fig. 4.3
presents a more reliable picture of the traffic density since our mode measurement model considers
the probable variations in g-factor over time. Next, we show that this model can be used efficiently
in a differentially private scheme.
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Figure 4.3 Real-time density map reconstruction with a non-private extended Kalman filter based
on Algorithm. 1
Figure 4.4 Real-time density map reconstruction with a non-private extended Kalman filter pre-
sented in [3]
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4.6 Differentially Private Mode and Density Measurements
The measurements obtained from the single loop detectors, i.e, counts cij,k, and occupancies o
i
j,k,
cannot be directly used in any traffic estimator architecture, because they could reveal private
information about people who contribute these measurements. In this section, we present dif-
ferentially private algorithms that output the private flow and traffic mode measurements. These
sanitized pseudo-measurements are then used in providing differentially private density pseudo-
measurements which is a sufficient observation signal to construct our differentially private density
map. The mechanism processing the counts data in order to provide differentially private flows is a
simple Gaussian mechanism (3) which was first presented in [3].
In order to provide the private traffic mode measurements, we introduce a new mechanism for san-
itizing data sequences which is mainly based on Algorithm 1.
Next, we first review the Gaussian mechanism providing the private flow measurements. Then, the
mechanism that provides the mode pseudo-measurements is presented.
4.6.1 Flow Measurements
Similar to [3], the mechanism processing the counts data in order to provide private flow measure-
ments can be a Gaussian mechanism (3). We can consider the following adjacency relation for the
counts datasets of N user trajectories C := {cij,k : k ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ S , 1 ≤ j ≤ λi}
for all c, c˜ ∈ C : Ad j(c, c˜) iff ∀k ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [1, S ] ,∀ j ∈
[
1, λi
]
, i, j ∈ N, ∃ ( j1, k1) , ( j2, k2)
s.t.
∣∣∣∣cij1,k1 − c˜ij1,k1 ∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1, ∣∣∣∣cij2,k2 − c˜ij2,k2 ∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 and cij,k = c˜ij,k ∀ ( j, k) , ( j1, k1) , ( j2, k2) .
(4.24)
this adjacency relation indicates that changing the route of a single car could affect the counts
measurements reported by each sensor i in at most two different time steps. To make it more clear,
suppose that Sara’s car triggers a number of sensors everyday when she goes to her job in the
morning. In order for differentially private protect her absence or her presence, we must consider
changing her trajectory could change the reported counts of each sensor at 2 different times, one
corresponding to one unit decrease in her usual trend of passing and the other corresponding to one
unit increase in her new trend.
Now, denote by φik (4.10) and φ˜
i
k, the two adjacent flow datasets. Then
∥∥∥φ − φ˜∥∥∥2
2
=
∞∑
k=0
M∑
i=1
∣∣∣φik − φ˜ik∣∣∣2 = M∑
i=1
∞∑
k=0
∣∣∣φik − φ˜ik∣∣∣2 .
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and for a sensor at the interface i→ i + 1 the corresponding term is
∞∑
k=0
∣∣∣φik − φ˜ik∣∣∣2 = 1T 2(λi)2
∞∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
λi∑
j=0
(
cij,k − c˜ij,k
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
Based on the adjacency relation (4.24), the counts cij,k and c˜
i
j,k must be almost all identical, except
for the fact that some vehicles A and B can cross the line of the sensor at different periods and in
different lanes. Thus
∞∑
k=0
∣∣∣φik − φ˜ik∣∣∣2 = 1T 2 (λi)2
∞∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
λi∑
j=0
(
cij,k − c˜ij,k
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ 2
T 2 (λi)2
,
and finally,
∥∥∥φ − φ˜∥∥∥2
2
=
M∑
i=1
∞∑
k=0
∣∣∣φik − φ˜ik∣∣∣2 ≤ 2T 2
M∑
i=1
1
(λi)2
: ∆ f 2. (4.25)
Now based on Theorem 3 in chapter 2 , the mechanism publishing for each sensor the perturbed
flow pseudo-measurements Φik = φ
i
k + n
i
k, where n
i
k are independent zero-mean white Gaussian
noise signals with covariance κ2δ,∆ f
2 , with ∆ f defined in (4.25) , is (, δ)-differentially private.
4.6.2 Density and Mode Measurements
The flow pseudo-measurements
Φik = φ
i
k + n
i
k (4.26)
obtained from the Gaussian mechanism can be used in calculating the density pseudo-measurements,
but this requires an additional mode estimate. However, estimating the mode of the traffic based on
the count or the occupancy datasets and without sanitization, could compromise private information
of individuals. In this section, we present our private mode measurement that is mainly based on
the mode measurement model presented in Section (4.5). Similar to (4.24), the adjacency relation
for the occupancies datasets of N user routes O := {oij,k : k ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ S , 0 ≤ j ≤ λi} is
for all o, o˜ ∈ O : Adj (o, o˜) iff ∀k ≥ 0, ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [1, S ] ,∀ j ∈
[
1, λi
]
, i, j ∈ N,∃ ( j1, k1) , ( j2, k2) ,
ψ ∈ [0, 1] s.t.
∣∣∣∣oij1,k1 − o˜ij1,k1 ∣∣∣∣ ≤ ψ, ∣∣∣∣oij2,k2 − o˜ij2,k2 ∣∣∣∣ ≤ ψ and oij,k = o˜ij,k ∀( j, k) , ( j1, k1) , ( j2, k2) .
(4.27)
For the occupancy data, we bound the allowed deviation on the reported occupancy, when we add
or remove one vehicle. In effect, this means that we offer no privacy protection to vehicles that
change the measured cumulative occupancy too much (or that change the average speed too much,
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since the occupancy contribution of one car is proportional to the inverse of its velocity). In other
words, the occupancy time due to a single vehicle, equal to
OcarT =
lcar
vcar
(4.28)
with T the sampling period, and lcar the average car length. If changing the trajectory of a single
vehicle changes the measured occupancy by ψ, the velocity of that vehicle must be
vcar =
lcar
ψT
and this velocity even for a 7 meters long car is
0.84
ψ
km/h, that potentially corresponds to a car
sitting on a sensor line for big values of ψ .
On the other hand, considering the occupancy 0 ≤ oij,k ≤ 1, the adjacency relation(4.27) will re-
sult in a high sensitivity and the corresponding standard Gaussian perturbation mechanism leads to
unreliable occupancy pseudo-measurements, especially when the number of single-loop detectors
in the road increases. Instead of using the occupancy measurements directly to estimate the den-
sity, the strategy adopted here is to re-consider the mode pseudo-measurement model presented in
Algorithm. 1 from a differential privacy perspective, i.e, checking out how model (4.22) behaves
when the trajectory of a single vehicle changes. Thus, let’s re-consider model(4.22)
Mik =

F i f 1TF−TC
(
(Φik, y
i
k)
)
= 1
C i f 1TC−TF
(
(Φik, y
i
k)
)
= 1
Mik−r i f
[∏r−1
s=0 1TC∩TF
(
(Φik−s, y
i
k−s)
)]
1T¯C∪T¯F
(
(Φik−r, y
i
k−r)
)
= 1, r > 0
(4.29)
here we replace flow measurements (4.10) by the flow pseudo-measurements Φik (4.26) . By chang-
ing the trajectory of a single vehicle, we have
M˜ik =

F i f 1TF−TC
(
(Φ˜ik, y˜
i
k)
)
= 1
C i f 1TC−TF
(
(Φ˜ik, y˜
i
k)
)
= 1
M˜ik−r i f
[∏r−1
s=0 1TC∩TF
(
(Φ˜ik−s, y˜
i
k−s)
)]
1T¯C∪T¯F
(
(Φ˜ik−r, y˜
i
k−r
)
= 1, r > 0
(4.30)
defining y˜ik − yik = ∆yik, Φ˜ik − Φik = ∆Φik, and according to the adjacency relations defined in (4.24),
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(4.27), we have
∀i ∈ [1, S ] , ∃k1, k2 s.t.
∣∣∣∆yik1 ∣∣∣ ≤ ψgλi , ∣∣∣∆yik2 ∣∣∣ ≤ ψgλi , ∆yik = 0 ∀i , i0,∣∣∣∆Φik1 ∣∣∣ ≤ 1Tλi , ∣∣∣∆Φik2 ∣∣∣ ≤ 1Tλi , ∆Φik = 0 ∀i , i0. (4.31)
Then, all the possible mode switching resulted from changing the trajectory of a single vehicle is
shown in following lemma.
Lemma 12. For the sets TF and TC defined in (4.17), (4.18), and all flows Φik, we have
1TF
(
(Φik, y
i
k)
)
1TC
(
(Φ˜ik, y˜
i
k)
)
= 0, if Φik <
[
α, qmax
]
,
and 1TC
(
(Φik, y
i
k)
)
1TF
(
(Φ˜ik, y˜
i
k)
)
= 0,
(4.32)
where α = min

e−ζ(g)
(
ρmax − 1Tλiw
)
− ψgλi
eζ(g)
v f
+ 1eζ(g)w
, qmax
 ,
e
−ζ(g)ρmax − eζ(g)Tλiv f −
ψ
gλi
eζ(g)
v f
+ 1eζ(g)w

.
Proof. Following Lemma 11 , and in view of (4.20) ,(4.21) ,
1TF
(
(Φik, y
i
k)
)
1TC
(
(φ˜ik, y˜
i
k)
)
= 1 iff

e−ζ(g)
Φik
v f
≤ [eζ(g)(ρmax −
Φik + ∆Φ
i
k
w
)] − ∆yik
and
[e−ζ(g)(ρmax −
Φik + ∆Φ
i
k
w
)] − ∆yik ≤ eζ(g)
Φik
v f
1TC
(
(Φik, y
i
k)
)
1TF
(
(φ˜ik, y˜
i
k)
)
= 1 iff

e−ζ(g)(ρmax −
Φik
w
) ≤ [eζ(g) Φ
i
k + ∆Φ
i
k
v f
] − ∆yik
and
[e−ζ(g)
Φik + ∆Φ
i
k
v f
] − ∆yik ≤ eζ(g)(ρmax −
Φik
w
)
(4.33)
that is to say F → C if Φ
i
k ∈ A
C → F if Φik ∈ B
where
A =

[
e−ζ(g)
(
ρmax − 1Tλiw
)]
− ψ
gλi
eζ(g)
v f
+
1
eζ(g)w
, qmax
 , B =

e−ζ(g)ρmax − e
ζ(g)
Tλiv f
− ψ
gλi
eζ(g)
v f
+
1
eζ(g)w
, qmax

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where we fix the maximum of each interval at qmax in order to prevent any likelihood of privacy
leakage. The minimums are also minimized over corresponding parameters based on (4.31). Fi-
nally, the proof is obtained by
1TF
(
(Φik, y
i
k)
)
1TC
(
(Φ˜ik, y˜
i
k)
)
= 0, if Φik < A ∪ B
and 1TC
(
(Φik, y
i
k)
)
1TF
(
(Φ˜ik, y˜
i
k)
)
= 0,
(4.34)

The above lemma shows that for the flow pseudo-measurement Φik ≤ α, changing the trajectory of
a single vehicle does not affect the outcome of mode measurement model (4.29). Accordingly, we
now develop our private mode measurement model. Based on Lemma. 12 , we first define the sets
PTF =
{(
Φik, y
i
k
)
:
∣∣∣∣∣∣log
[
φik
v f
]
− log
[
yik
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ζ(g), Φik ∈ [0, α) ∀i, k
}
PTC =
{(
φik, y
i
k
)
:
∣∣∣∣∣∣log
[
ρmax −
φik
w
]
− log
[
yik
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ζ(g), Φik ∈ [0, α) ∀i, k
}
corresponding to the pseudo-flow Φik satisfying our private truncation in free mode (F) or congested
mode (C). Defining P¯TC and P¯T F , the complement sets of PTC and PTF respectively, we could
form the private mode measurement model as
Mik =

F i f 1PTF−PTC
(
(Φik, y
i
k)
)
= 1
C i f 1PTC−PTF
(
(Φik, y
i
k)
)
= 1
Mik−r i f
[∏r−1
s=0 1PTC∩PTF
(
(Φik−s, y
i
k−s)
)]
1P¯TC∪P¯T F
(
(Φik−r, y
i
k−r)
)
= 1, r > 0
(4.35)
Similar to Fig. 4.5 , we could also divide the triangular fundamental diagram into two zones, we
call here the Private zone and the Non-Private zone. For illustrative purposes, these zones are
depicted with a green line and a red line on Fig. 4.5 . The Private zone for example, illustrates
the flow interval for which the mode of the traffic can be estimated uniquely based on truncation
(4.15), and also changing the trajectory of a single vehicle does not affect the mode estimation.
The diagram is depicted for a four-lane road and the parameters related to the fundamental diagram
and the model are v f = 65 mph, w = 11.6 mph, ρmax = 193 vehicles/mile/lane, g = 20 feet and
ζ(g) = 0.51. We also take ψ = 0.25 that is sufficiently large to protect the privacy of individuals,
i.e, all the vehicles that cross the sensor line faster than 3km/h, assuming vehicles with at least 7
meters long. Note that our model for the flows in Non-Private zone, estimates the mode of the
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Figure 4.5 The mode of the traffic in private zone is resistant to the change of the trajectory of a
single vehicle.
traffic at each sensor location based on the previous estimated mode for which the flow is in Private
zone. Adopting this strategy minimizes the possibility of privacy leakage while it still provides
a meaningful observation signal to specify the mode. Our model of obtaining the private density
pseudo-measurements is demonstrated by Algorithm. 2 .
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1- Perturb the flow measurements (4.10) to obtain the differentially private flow
pseudo-measurements Φik = φ
i
k + n
i
k.
2- based on historical data choose base g-factor, e.g, 20 feet, and an upper-bound error
ζ(g).
3- Set the maximum deviation ψ (4.28) in two adjacent occupancy data. Note that
picking ψ too big spoils the mode estimation with the goal of protecting the privacy of
too slow vehicles.
4- Specify the corresponding Private and Non-private zones based on Lemma (12).
5- mik = F/C based on the mode measurement model (4.35).
6- Filter mik thorough the HMM filter to obtain the actual mode s
i
k used to invert the
fundamental diagram.(see the discussion for HMM filter in Section 4.5)
7-
zik = z
i+1
k =

Φik
v f
i f sik = F
ρmax −
Φik
w
i f sik = C
(4.36)
Algorithm 2: Private density measurement
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4.7 Traffic state Estimation
In this section, we present the overall architecture of our differentially private traffic state estimator,
and illustrate its performance on the Mobile Century experiment dataset [36]. Fig. 4.6 illustrates the
overall architecture of our privacy preserving traffic estimator. The extended Kalman filter (EKF)
assimilates the dynamic traffic model (4.4) and the density pseudo-measurements zik, obtained from
the occupancy and count measurements.
Figure 4.6 Architecture of our differentially private traffic estimator. The red arrows represent
differentially private signals, i.e, perturbed flow pseudo-measurements from vehicle counts, and
private mode estimate built from both counts and occupancy measurements
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The differential privacy guarantee provided by this architecture is the sum of guarantees provided
by the Gaussian mechanism and our private mode measurement model. Recalling Theorem 3 in
chapter 2 , we now specify how much privacy guarantee is provided by our mode measurement
model.
Lemma 13. Consider D =
{(
ci1,k, .., c
i
λi,k, o
i
1,k, .., o
i
λi,k
)
∀i, k
}
, consists of the count and occupancy
datasets with adjacency relations defined in (4.24) , (4.27). Let d, d′ be two adjacent elements in D
with K rows. Define E = {Ei : Ei = e1 × e2 × ... × eK , ei = [0, α) or [α, qmax] for all i = 1, ..., 2K},
with α defined in Lemma. 12 , specifying the private zone. Then for our private mode measurement
mechanism M, and the flow pseudo measurement Φ, we have
M(d) = M(d′) if Φ(d),Φ(d′) ∈ Ei, ∀d, d′ ∈ D, and for all i = 1, ...2K . (4.37)
Proof. For two pair of adjacent data d, d′, if their pseudo-flows Φ(d), Φ(d′) are in the same zone,
the mode measurement model will result in identical outputs, because the model always estimate
the mode with respect to the flows in private zone. Hence, the model automatically ignores any
change in occupancy measurements resulted from adding or removing one vehicle. 
Theorem 14. The private mode estimation mechanism defined in (4.35) is (, δ)-differentially pri-
vate.
Proof. Define χ = {F,C}K , for all d, d′ ∈ D and s ∈ χ, we have
P(M(d) ∈ s) =
2k∑
i=1
[P (M(d) ∈ s | Φ(d) ∈ Ei)P (Φ(d) ∈ Ei)] =
2k∑
i=1
[
P
(
M(d′) ∈ s | Φ(d′) ∈ Ei)P (Φ(d) ∈ Ei)]
where the last equality resulted from (4.37) . The flow mechanism Φ(d) = φ(d) + n is the output of
a Gaussian mechanism and is (, δ)-differentially private, hence
P (Φ(d) ∈ Ei) =
1
(2piσ2)k/2
∫
Ei
e
−
‖u − φ(d′)‖2
2σ2 e
2(u − φ(d′))T (φ(d) − φ(d′)) − ‖φ(d) − φ(d′)‖2
2σ2 du ≤
eP
(
Φ(d′) ∈ Ei) +
1
(2piσ2)k/2
∫
Ei
e−
‖u − φ(d)‖2
2σ2 1
{
2(u − φ(d′))T (φ(d) − φ(d′)) ≥ ‖φ(d) − φ(d′)‖2 + 2σ2
} du
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and the last integral term defines a measure that is bounded by δ (we refer the reader for more details
to proof of Theorem 3 in [16]). Define A be the flow area indicated by the indicator function, for
the last integral we then have
1
(2piσ2)k/2
∫
Ei
e
‖u − φ(d)‖2
2σ2 1
{
2(u − φ(d′))T (φ(d) − φ(d′)) ≥ ‖φ(d) − φ(d′)‖2 + 2σ2
} du
= P(Φ(d) ∈ [A ∩ Ei]) = P(Φ(d) ∈ A) P(Φ(d) ∈ Ei | Φ(d) ∈ A)
we know σ2 = ‖φ(d) − φ(d′)‖2 κ2,δ, by straightforward calculation we have
P(Φ(d) ∈ A) = δ and P(Φ(d) ∈ [A ∩ Ei]) = δ P(Φ(d) ∈ Ei | Φ(d) ∈ A)
Hence
P(M(d) ∈ s) ≤
2k∑
i=1
P
(
M(d′) ∈ s | Φ(d′) ∈ Ei) [eP (Φ(d′) ∈ Ei) + δ P(Φ(d) ∈ Ei | Φ(d) ∈ A)]
= eP
(
M(d′) ∈ s) + δ 2k∑
i=1
P
(
M(d′) ∈ s | Φ(d′) ∈ Ei)P(Φ(d) ∈ Ei | Φ(d) ∈ A)
= eP
(
M(d′) ∈ s) + δ 2k∑
i=1
P (M(d) ∈ s | Φ(d) ∈ Ei)P(Φ(d) ∈ Ei | Φ(d) ∈ A)
and the last sum is bounded by 1, because it is the summation for mutually exclusive events Φ(d) ∈
Ei , conditioned on a single event Φ(d) ∈ A . 
Finally, the differential privacy guarantee for the overall architecture based on Theorem 2 is the
sum of (2, 2δ) obtained from (, δ)-differential privacymode measurement and (, δ)-differential
privacyflow pseudo-measurement.
4.7.1 Discussion
Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8, show examples of (log(2), 0.05) and (log(4), 0.1)-differential private maps
respectively, based on our designed private traffic estimator. The complete map is built by using
10 out of the 27 sensors which placed at the 4-lane locations along I-880. Our result improves
over the state of the art in terms of the privacy guarantee, and has immediate applications in pro-
viding privacy for traffic monitoring of long highways. The reliability of the map is also improved
in the sense that the incorrect switching between the modes has mitigated significantly. Compar-
ison of the three maps presented in Fig. 4.7 , 4.8 and 4.3 illustrates that we could provide strong
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(log(4), 0.1), and even very strong (log(2), 0.05) privacy guarantees based on our approach and still
do not have too much degradation in estimation performance. However, it is possible that our al-
gorithm estimates the mode of the flows in non-private zone with error, mainly due to the delay
introduced by our mode measurement model. For example, assume that the traffic flow increases
and the road becomes congested. The mode of the traffic based on our private mode measurement
model will be free (F) until the flow goes into the private zone again. In this case we could have
up to 60 (vehicles/mile/lane) error in our density maps according to Fig. 4.5 . The upper-bound of
these errors could be tightened by decreasing parameter ψ. For example, ψ = 0.1 can decrease the
upper-bound of this errors to 40 units, but it will weaken the privacy guarantee at the same time.
One effective idea to improve the mode measurement where the flow is in sensitive zone is
for all Φik ∈ [α, qmax] :
F if Φ
i
k − Φik−1 > 0
C if Φik − Φik−1 < 0
(4.38)
this model takes advantage of this fact that the dynamic of the flow is either decreasing or increasing
corresponding to the congested (C) mode and free (F) mode respectively. However, unfortunately
it seems unwieldy at this point to be used in a more advanced mechanism.
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Figure 4.7 Real-time density map reconstruction with (log(2), 0.05)- differential privacy guarantee
presented based on our approach
Figure 4.8 Real-time density map reconstruction with (log(4), 0.1)- differential privacy guarantee
presented based on our approach
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CHAPITRE 5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this Master’s thesis we presented differentially private event stream filtering in a theoretical con-
texts for MIMO filters. The results were presented through rigorous mathematical proofs and based
on them two important real world applications were studied. we have extended the ZFE mechanism
of [16, 26] to the MIMO case. An optimal ZFE mechanism was obtained for the approximation of
SIMO filters, and a suboptimal one considering only diagonal pre-filters was obtained for general
MIMO filters. Next in Chapter 4, our differentially private traffic estimator was presented. Our
results improves over state of the art and in particular the privacy preserving guarantee provided by
our model improves very significantly over the previous design in [3]. Briefly, We presented
1. Differentially private event stream filtering in a theoretical contexts for MIMO filters.
2. Privacy preserving building monitoring
3. Privacy preserving traffic monitoring which describes techniques that can guarantee the dif-
ferential privacy of individual users whose data is used to provide online estimation of the
traffic state on a road section. In contrast to previously proposed privacy-preserving schemes
for location-based services, we specifically target the release of aggregated quantities, such
as effective traffic speed and density, and we rely on a macroscopic hydrodynamic model of
the dynamics of these variables to provide sufficiently accurate estimators.
5.1 Future work
Future work includes developing MIMO mechanisms for situations where more information is
available about the input signals, e.g., their second-order statistics, in which case one can improve
on the ZFE mechanism [11]. Future work on designing a privacy preserving traffic estimator also
includes improving the accuracy of mode measurements by applying an adaptive HMM filter and
also studying the effects of increasing the number of sensors, and how this increasing affects the
estimation.
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